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論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2000
摘要
We study a model in which 合作 and defection coexist in a dynamical steady state. In our model, sub族群s of cooperators and defectors inhabit sites on a lattice. The interactions among the individuals at a site, in the form of a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, determine their fitnesses. The chosen PD payoff allows cooperators, but not defectors, to maintain a homogeneous 族群. Individuals mutate between types and migrate to neighboring sites with low probabilities. We consider both density-dependent and density-independent versions of the model. The persistence of 合作 in this model can be explained in terms of the life cycle of a 族群 at a site. This life cycle starts when one cooperator establishes a 族群. Then defectors invade and eventually take over, resulting finally in the death of the 族群. During
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