摘要 Alarm calling behaviour is common in many 物種 that

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論文資訊

• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2001

摘要

Alarm-calling behaviour is common in many 物種 that suffer from predation. While kin selection or reciprocal 利他主義 are typically invoked to explain such behaviours, several authors have conjectured that some alarm calls may instead be costly signals sent by 獵物 to inform approaching 捕食者s that they have been detected. We develop a general game-theoretical model, the watchful babbler game, in which 獵物 signal awareness to 捕食者s. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for alarm calls to function as honest signals. We show that signals can honestly reveal 獵物 awareness if (1) the 獵物's sense of predation risk accurately reflects the probability that the 捕食者 is present, and (2) greater awareness of the 捕食者 allows the 獵物 a greater chance of escape. When honest signalling is possible, the model pr

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