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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2001
摘要
We propose an explanation of 合作 among unrelated members of a 社會 group in which 合作 evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-合作 would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be 演化arily stable, and can proliferate in a 族群 in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that w
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