摘要 Both laboratory and field data suggest that peopl

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論文資訊

• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2003

摘要

Both laboratory and field data suggest that people punish noncooperators even in one-shot interactions. Although such "altruistic punishment" may explain the high levels of 合作 in human societies, it creates an 演化ary puzzle: existing models suggest that altruistic 合作 among nonrelatives is 演化arily stable only in small groups. Thus, applying such models to the 演化 of altruistic punishment leads to the prediction that people will not incur costs to punish others to provide benefits to large groups of nonrelatives. However, here we show that an important asymmetry between altruistic 合作 and altruistic punishment allows altruistic punishment to evolve in 族群s engaged in one-time, anonymous interactions. This process allows both altruistic punishment and altruistic 合作 to be maintained even when grou

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