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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2004
摘要
How do human groups maintain a high level of 合作 despite a low level of 遺傳 relatedness among group members? We suggest that many humans have a predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial norms, even when this imposes a fitness cost on the punisher. Such altruistic punishment is widely observed to sustain high levels of 合作 in behavioral experiments and in natural settings. We offer a model of 合作 and punishment that we call strong reciprocity: where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a 社會 norm, strong reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators, even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group members, such as selfish 智能體s who violate the norm and do not punish, and pure cooperators who adhere to the norm but free-ride by never puni
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