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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2005
摘要
We introduce and study an 演化ary complementarity game where in each round a player of 族群 1 is paired with a member of 族群 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of them pushes too hard, no deal at all can be concluded, and they both lose. The game has many equilibria, and which of them is reached depends on the history of the interactions as the players evolve according to a fitness function that measures their gains across the interactions. We can then break the symmetry by assigning different strategy spaces to the 族群s, varying in particular with respect to the 資訊 available to the 智能體s. The 智能體s can, for example, adapt to the behavior of their opponents met in previous rounds, or they can try to copy the strategies of their successful f
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