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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2008
摘要
社會 preferences such as 利他主義, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating 社會ly desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional 經濟 incentives and 社會 preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out 社會 preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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