摘要 Both economists and biologists have developed rep

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論文資訊

• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2009

摘要

Both economists and biologists have developed repeated interaction models of 合作 in 社會 dilemmas with groups of self- regarding individuals. Repeated interactions do provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors, and may be effective in groups of two individuals. However, these models are inadequate for groups of larger size, making plausible assumptions about the 資訊 available to each individual. Moreover, even presupposing extraordinary 認知 capacities and levels of patience among the cooperating individuals, it is unlikely that a group of more than two individuals would ever adopt the cooperative equilibria that the models have identified, and almost certainly, if it were to adopt one, its members would abandon it in short order. Though intended as models of decen

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