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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2009
摘要
The 資訊 content of prices is a central problem in the general equilibrium analysis of competitive markets. Rational expectations equilibrium identifies conditioning simultaneously on contemporaneous prices and private 資訊 as the mechanism by which 資訊 enters prices. Here we look to the 生態學 of markets for an explanation of the 資訊 content of prices. Markets could select across traders with different beliefs, or, reminiscent of 'the wisdom of crowds', markets could balance the diverse 資訊 of many participants. We provide theoretical support in favor of the first mechanism, and against the second. Along the way we demonstrate that the necessary condition for long-run survival in complete markets found in Sandroni [2000. Do markets favor 智能體s able to make accurate predictions? Econometrica 68 (6),
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