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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2010
摘要
Because mutually beneficial 合作 may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free- riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining 合作. In contrast, current models of the 演化 of 合作 assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the 演化ary 湧現 of punishment because rare unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and hence are eliminated. Moreover, in human behavioral experiments in which punishment is uncoordinated, the sum of costs to punishers and their targets often exceeds the benefits of the increased 合作 that results from the punishment of free-riders. As a result, 合作 sustained by punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in which pun
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