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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2010
摘要
This article shows that 社會 norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational 智能體s playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the 文化 system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect 資訊, we need in addition only to posit that individuals obey the 社會 norm when it is costless to do so. When the correlating device has incomplete 資訊, the operation of the 社會 norm requires that individuals have a predisposition to follow the norm even when this is costly. The latter case explains why 社會 no
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