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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2010
摘要
We study the 演化 of 合作 in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the 合作-promoting effect of costly punishment, besides the usual strategy adoption dynamics we also apply strategy 突變s. As expected, frequent 突變s create kind of well-mixed conditions, which support the spreading of defectors. However, when the 突變 rate is small, the final stationary state does not significantly differ from the state of the 突變-free model, independently of the values of the punishment fine and cost. Nevertheless, the 突變 rate affects the relaxation dynamics. Rare 突變s can largely accelerate the spreading of costly punishment. This is due to the fact that the presence of defectors breaks the balanc
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