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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2010
摘要
We study the 演化 of 合作 in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of 合作 (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the 演化ary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and 合作 may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers, increasing the fine results in a rising 合作 level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the
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