摘要 We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of

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論文資訊

• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2010

摘要

We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of 智能體s in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational 智能體s, and the auctioneer wants to purchase a vertex cover from them. For k-flow auctions, the edges are owned by the 智能體s, and the auctioneer wants to purchase k edge-disjoint s-t paths, for given s and t. In the same setting, for cut auctions, the auctioneer wants to purchase an s-t cut. Only the 智能體s know their costs, and the auctioneer needs to select a feasible set and payments based on bids made by the 智能體s. We present constant-competitive truthful mechanisms for all three set systems. That is, the maximum overpayment of the mechanism is within a constant factor of the

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