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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2011
摘要
We explore the manner in which the structure of a socia 網絡 constrains the level of 不平等 that can be sustained among its members, based on the following considerations: (i) any distribution of value must be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, and (ii) the 網絡 structure itself determines the coalitions that may form. We show that if players can jointly deviate ate only if they form a clique in the 網絡, then the degree of 不平等 that can be sustained depends on the cardinality of the maximum independent set. For bipartite 網絡s, the size of the maximum independent set fully characterizes the degree of 不平等 that can be sustained. This result extends partially to general 網絡s and to the case in which a group of players can deviate jointly if they are all sufficiently close to each other in the
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