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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2011
摘要
It is widely believed that one of the virtues of peer review is that it provides a self-regulating selection mechanism for scientific work, papers and projects. Peer review as a selection mechanism is hard to evaluate in terms of its efficiency. Serious efforts to understand its strengths and weaknesses have not yet lead to conclusive answers. In theory peer review works if the involved parties (editors and referees) conform to a set of requirements, such as love for high quality science, objectiveness, and absence of biases, nepotism, friend and clique 網絡s, selfishness, etc. If these requirements are violated, what is the effect on the selection of high quality work? We study this question with a simple 智能體 based model. In particular we are interested in the effects of rationalreferees, w
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