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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2011
摘要
This article highlights political science's interest in the distribution of authority between federal and state governments. The authority boundaries are studied (a) as mechanism design problems, where authority is allocated optimally to achieve 社會 goals; (b) as problems in positive political theory, because the authority distribution creates competitive interests; (c) as an institutional design problem, where the boundaries are maintained by safeguards; and (d) as a complex adaptive system, where the boundaries evolve in response to the interaction of diverse 智能體s. The article concludes with a suggestion that as dynamic models of constitutional 演化 develop, reflecting the bottom-up process and the responsiveness to the 文化 community, federal constitutional design may transform from optimali
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