聖塔非研究所

摘要 Explicit 經濟 incentives designed to increase contr

2012 · 已發表論文 · 更新 2026/08/30 下午12:48

摘要 Explicit 經濟 incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro 社會 behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted am…

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論文資訊

  • 類型:已發表論文
  • 日期:2012

摘要

Explicit 經濟 incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-社會 behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals' 利他主義, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other 社會 preferences. The opposite also occurs-crowding in-though it appears less commonly. In the fifty experiments that we survey, these effects are common, so that incentives and 社會 preferences may be either substitutes (crowding out) or complements (crowding in). We provide evidence for four mechanisms that may account for these incentive effects on preferences: namely that incentives may (i) provide 資訊 about the person who implemented th

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