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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2012
摘要
Recent work in several fields has established that humans can adopt binding “behavioral” preferences and convincingly signal those preferences to other humans, either via their behavior or via their body 語言 / tone of voice. In this paper, we model the strategic implications of this ability. Our thesis is that through a person’s lifetime they (perhaps subconsciously) learn what such signaled, binding behavioral preferences result in the highest value of their actual preferences, given the resultant behavior of other players. We argue that this “persona” model may explain why many interpersonal preferences have the particular form they do. As an illustration, we use the persona model to explain 合作 in non-repeated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). We also provide quantitative predictio
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