摘要 We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the

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論文資訊

• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2012

摘要

We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of 統計 physics to instead derive equilibria of bounded rational 賽局理論.We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by gradually imposing individual-specific tax rates on the players of the game, and then gradually removing those taxes, the players move from a poor equilibrium to one that is better for all of them.

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