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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2012-01-31
摘要
The standard theories of 合作 in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding 智能體s, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly 合作 and the punishment, fosters 合作 where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of 社會ly coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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