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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2012-04-12
摘要
Previous game-theoretic studies of 疫苗接種 behavior typically have often assumed that 族群s are homogeneously mixed and that individuals are fully rational. In reality, there is heterogeneity in the number of contacts per individual, and individuals tend to imitate others who appear to have adopted successful strategies. Here, we use 網絡-based 數學 models to study the effects of both imitation behavior and contact heterogeneity on 疫苗接種 coverage and 疾病 dynamics. We integrate contact 網絡 流行病學ological models with a framework for decision-making, within which individuals make their decisions either based purely on payoff maximization or by imitating the 疫苗接種 behavior of a 社會 contact. Simulations suggest that when the cost of 疫苗接種 is high imitation behavior may decrease 疫苗接種 coverage. However, when the
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