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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2013-07-31
摘要
Costly signalling theory is commonly invoked as an explanation for how honest communication can be stable when interests conflict. However, the signal costs predicted by costly signalling models often turn out to be unrealistically high. These models generally assume that signal cost is determinate. Here, we consider the case where signal cost is instead 隨機. We examine both discrete and continuous signalling games and show that, under reasonable assumptions, 隨機ity in signal costs can decrease the average cost at equilibrium for all individuals. This effect of 隨機ity for decreasing signal costs is a fundamental mechanism that probably acts in a wide variety of circumstances.
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