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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2013-08-30
摘要
Animals can often coordinate their actions to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. However, this can result in a 社會 dilemma when uncertainty about the behavior of partners creates multiple fitness peaks. Strategies that minimize risk ("risk dominant") instead of maximizing reward ("payoff dominant") are favored in 經濟 models when individuals learn behaviors that increase their payoffs. Specifically, such strategies are shown to be "隨機ally stable" (a refinement of 演化ary stability). Here, we extend the notion of 隨機 stability to 生物 models of continuous phenotypes at a 突變-selection-drift balance. This allows us to make a unique prediction for long-term 演化 in games with multiple equilibria. We show how 遺傳 relatedness due to limited dispersal and scaled to account for local competition can cruci
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