摘要 We present a 數學 model for the analysis of the bar

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• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2013-09-27

摘要

We present a 數學 model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies in Gintis (2007). We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the only 隨機ally stable state. Hence, we provide dynamic foundations for general equilibrium for one of the best-known example of instability of the tatonement process.

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