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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2014-06-01
摘要
In matters of public policy, economists often design incentives and constraints so that 經濟 actors with unrestricted preferences (including the self-interested motivations of homo 經濟us) will implement 社會ly desired allocations. This paradigm, which dates to Machiavelli, contrasts sharply with an earlier approach, initiated by Aristotle, in which good governance entailed the cultivation of good citizens. Modern mechanism design, contract theory, and behavioral 經濟s provide a critical perspective on the Machiavellian paradigm, and suggest a reformulation along more Aristotelian lines.
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