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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2014-10-08
摘要
In both experimental and natural settings, incentives sometimes underperform, generating smaller effects on the targeted behaviors than would be predicted for entirely self-regarding 智能體s. A parsimonious explanation is that incentives that appeal to self-regarding 經濟 motives may crowd out non經濟 motives such as 利他主義, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, ethical values, and other 社會 preferences, leading to disappointing and sometimes even counterproductive incentive effects. We present evidence from behavioral experiments that crowding may take two forms: categorical (the effect on preferences depends only on the presence or absence of the incentive) or marginal (the effect depends on the extent of the incentive). We extend an earlier contribution (Bowles and Hwang, 2008) to include categorica
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