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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2016-02-11
摘要
The most straightforward defense of political democracy is grounded in rational choice. Political democracy gives people power in public life parallel to that afforded by markets in private life: the power to turn their preferences into 社會 outcomes. However, rational choice models of voter behavior dramatically underpredict voter turnout in all but the smallest elections. Fiorina (1990) has called this "the paradox that ate rational choice theory." This anomaly is the centerpiece of Green and Shapiro's (1994) critique of rational choice methodology in political theory. This paper proposes a form of 社會 rationality that strengthens the classical rational actor model. This concept explains many central 統計 regularities concerning voter turnout and the historical regularities concerning collect
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