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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2016-07-27
摘要
How can a principal (employer or voter) induce an 智能體 (worker or politician) to choose the "right" actions if risky actions reveal the 智能體's decision-making competence and only dismissal can be used as an incentive instrument? We first show that if the principal can commit to a replacement strategy, then optimal mechanisms involve either (i) a probationary period and then indefinite tenure, or (ii) dismissing poorly performing 智能體s but also randomly replacing 智能體s who take nonrevealing actions. When the principal cannot commit, incentives can be improved by imposing term limits on 智能體s.
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