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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2017-04-01
摘要
We examine the interplay between 社會 norms and the enforcement of laws. 智能體s choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, harassing behavior, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another 智能體. There are complementarities in behaviors so that an 智能體's payoff decreases with the mismatch between her behavior and her partner's, and with overall negative externalities created by the behavior of others. A law is an upper bound (cap) on behavior. A law-breaker, when detected, pays a fine and has her behavior forced down to the level of the law. Equilibrium law-breaking depends on 社會 norms because detection relies, at least in part, on whistle-blowing. Law-abiding 智能體s have an incentive to whistle-blow on a law-breaking partner because th
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