本頁只刊出中文翻譯與中文說明；英文原文請見下方原文連結。
原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2017-05-29
摘要
When banks extend loans to each other, they generate a negative externality in the form of systemic risk. They create a 網絡 of interbank exposures by which they expose other banks to potential insolvency cascades. In this paper, we show how a regulator can use 資訊 about the financial 網絡 to devise a transaction-specific tax based on a 網絡 centrality measure that captures systemic importance. Since different transactions have different impact on creating systemic risk, they are taxed differently. We call this tax a systemic risk tax (SRT). We use an equilibrium concept inspired by the matching markets literature to show analytically that this SRT induces a unique equilibrium matching of lenders and borrowers that is systemic-risk efficient, i.e. it minimizes systemic risk given a certain transa
※ 此為已發表論文，全文需透過期刊付費取得