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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2017-06-22
摘要
When a new product or technology is introduced, potential consumers can learn its quality by trying it, at a risk, or by letting others try it and free-riding on the 資訊 that they generate. We propose a dynamic game to study the adoption of technologies of uncertain value, when 智能體s are connected by a 網絡 and a monopolist seller chooses a profit maximizing policy. Consumers with low degree (few friends) have incentives to adopt early, while consumers with high degree have incentives to free ride. The seller can induce high degree consumers to adopt early by offering referral incentives-rewards to early adopters whose friends buy in the second period. Referral incentives thus lead to a 'double-threshold strategy' by which low and high-degree 智能體s adopt the product early while middle degree 智能
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