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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2017-10-23
摘要
Differences among nations in culture (preferences including 社會 norms) and institutions (contracts) may result in specialization and gains from trade even in the absence of exogenous differences in factor endowments or technologies. Goods differ in the kinds of contracts that are appropriate for their production, and so strategic complementarities between contracts and 社會 norms may result in a multiplicity of 文化-institutional equilibria. The resulting country differences in culture and institutions provide the basis for comparative advantage. In our 演化ary model of endogenous preferences and institutions, transitions among persistent 文化-institutional configurations occur as a result of decentralized and uncoordinated contractual or behavioral innovations by employers or employees. We show th
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