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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2018-12-21
摘要
Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different forms of 資訊 aggregation and decision-making. The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms of votes, and the Hong-Page '多樣性 trumps ability' result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation in the form of collaborative search. Both results, however, are models of full and direct participation across a 族群. In this paper, we contrast how these results hold up within the familiar structure of a representative hierarchy. We first consider extant analytic work that shows that representation inevitably weakens the voting results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We then go on to show that collaborative search, as modeled by Hong and Page, holds its own within hierarchical repre
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