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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2020-10-05
摘要
"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the 演化 of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, less attention has been paid to what is a signal. Most existing accounts are teleological in some way. This paper provides a definition of signals that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "資訊 revealing" and "資訊 concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication.
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