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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2021-10-03
摘要
Performing a dramatic act of religious devotion, creating an art exhibit, or releasing a new product are all examples of public acts that signal quality and contribute to building a reputation. Signalling theory predicts that these public displays can reliably reveal quality. However, data from ethnographic work in South India suggests that more prominent individuals gain more from reputation-building religious acts than more marginalized individuals. To understand this phenomenon, we extend signalling theory to include variation in people’s 社會 prominence or 社會 capital, first with an analytical model and then with an 智能體-based model. We consider two ways in which 社會 prominence/capital may alter signalling: (i) it impacts observers’ priors, and (ii) it alters the signallers’ pay-offs. These
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