本頁只刊出中文翻譯與中文說明；英文原文請見下方原文連結。
原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2023
摘要
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism by which individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated with others. This creates a regime in which repeated interactions are not necessary to incent 合作 (as would be required for direct reciprocity). However, indirect reciprocity creates a new problem: how do 智能體s know who has cooperated with others? To know this, 智能體s would need to access some form of reputation 資訊. Perhaps there is a communication system to disseminate reputation 資訊, but how does it remain truthful and informative? Most papers assume the existence of a truthful, forthcoming, and informative communication system; in this paper, we seek to explain how such a communication system could remain 演化arily stable in the absence of exogenous pressures. Specifically, we present three condit
※ 此為已發表論文，全文需透過期刊付費取得