摘要 We propose a theory of 社會 norms (or conventions)

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• 類型：已發表論文
• 日期：2024

摘要

We propose a theory of 社會 norms (or conventions) that implement substantial levels of 不平等 between men and women, ethnic groups, and classes and that persist over long periods of time despite being inefficient and not supported by formal institutions. Consistent with historical cases, we extend the standard asymmetric 隨機 演化ary game model to allow sub 族群 sizes to differ and idiosyncratic rejection of a status quo convention to be intentional to some degree (rather than purely random as in the standard 演化ary models). In this setting, if idiosyncratic play is sufficiently intentional and the subordinate class sufficiently large relative to the elite, then risk-dominated conventions that are both more unequal and inefficient relative to alternative conventions will be 隨機ally stable and may pers

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