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原文連結
論文資訊
- 類型：已發表論文
- 日期：2024-12-12
摘要
Covert identity signals permit the communication of group membership to ingroup members while avoiding potentially costly detection by members of other groups. If individuals are incentivized to detect others' group memberships, however, covert signals may not remain covert for very long. We propose a theoretical extension to the literature on covert signaling in which conventionalized identity signals can become destabilized when learned by outgroup individuals to be replaced by the 湧現 of new signaling conventions. We formalize this idea with both analytical and 智能體-based modeling of ingroup and outgroup individuals who learn about signals of group membership. Depending on the risk and associated cost of detection by the outgroup, the model yields three dynamic classes: saturation, where
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